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Abstract 
The role played by macroeconomic fluctuations in stimulating deposit dollarization in 
developing countries have been a subject of intense debate in the last few decades 
especially in Latin America and transition economies of Eastern Europe with little 
attention on African economies. Apart from this, most of the studies on African economies 
are country case studies with little scope for generalisation. This article examines the effect 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on deposit dollarization in 18 selected Sub-Saharan Africa 
for the period 1980 to 2004. Using the standard money demand model accounting for 
dollarization in small open economies, the article finds that inflation, expectations about 
exchange rate changes coupled with interaction between capital account restrictions and 
domestic inflation plays dominant roles in explaining deposit dollarization in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. Given the consequences of deposit dollarization on the vulnerability of the domestic 
banking system, lack of independent monetary policy and optimal exchange rate choices, 
the article concludes that macroeconomic instability must be adequately brought under 
control in other to reduce deposit dollarization in these economies.   
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1. Introduction 
The role played by macroeconomic fluctuations in stimulating deposit dollarization in 
developing countries and the effects of the latter for the conduct of monetary policy have 
been a subject of intense debate in the last few decades especially in Latin America and 
transition economies of Eastern Europe with little attention on African economies. Apart 
from this, most of the studies on African economies are country case studies with little scope 
for generalisation. Following the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) and subsequent liberalisation of foreign exchange markets, leading to the removal of 
many foreign exchange restrictions, a number of emerging market economies have moved 
from fixed to flexible exchange rates. In most African countries, the late 1980s and the early 
1990s were characterized by massive depreciation of their currencies as they sought to reduce 
and/or eliminate the influence of parallel market for foreign exchange that had existed in 
these countries over the years (Agenor, 2004). More importantly, the policy was designed to 
move the real exchange rate of currencies closer to equilibrium rate. Also, this policy was 
adopted in the hope that it would improve the competitiveness of their exports and also 
boosts non-traditional exports especially manufacturing exports.  
One of the major side effects of this policy shift was the use of foreign currency as a 
means of portfolio diversification option especially in economies where money and capital 
markets are under developed coupled high and prolonged inflation, and exchange rate 
volatility (Yinusa, 2008). In this situation, the U.S. dollar, the British pound sterling and/or 
German mark became means of payments and store value. 
The widespread use of foreign currencies, especially since the early 1990s in many 
emerging economies, has triggered a lot of research in pursuit of the determinants of 
dollarization (Agénor and Khan 1996; Yinusa and Akinlo, 2008a), of the economic elements 
that are affected by its development (Berg and Borenzstein 2000, Lange and Sauer 2005), and 
of explanations of its inertia (Clements and Schwartz 1993, Kamin and Ericsson 1993, 
Tandon and Wang 1999, 2003; de Freitas 2004). In addition, a recently developed line of 
work examines the extent to which dollarization is important for the conduct of effective 
monetary policy (see Reinhart et al. 2003; Yinusa and Akinlo, 2008b). 
A notable feature of most of these studies is their focus on the relationship between 
the rate of inflation and the degree of dollarization. On the one hand, they emphasize the 
direct effect the average rate of inflation has on dollarization as private agents substitute out 
of the domestic currency to hedge against the erosion of its value, which intensifies 
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dollarization. On the other hand, they stress the feedback effect of the degree of dollarization 
on the inflation rate as the base of the inflation tax shrinks and a financially constrained 
government monetizes its budget deficit, which, in turn, leads to higher inflation (Chang 
1994; Bahmani and Domac 2003; Levy-Yeyati 2004). The interplay between inflation and 
dollarization is also present in studies that examine the inertia of dollarization. Theoretical 
explanations of this phenomenon have mainly focused on the transactions costs of inflation 
involved in switching between two currencies (Guidotti and Rodriguez 1992; Uribe 1997; 
and de Freitas 2004), while empirically dollarization hysteresis has been accounted for by 
means of “ratchet effects”.  
On the policy making side, dollarization has attracted a lot of attention with regard to 
its influence in the design and transmission of monetary policy. Although the earlier literature 
expressed the concern that dollarization, by raising the volatility of money demand, may 
impede the ability of the central bank to conduct monetary policy and reduce inflation, recent 
work by Reinhart et al. (2003) and Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003) find no empirical 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis.  
Most of these studies focused on Latin American countries where the phenomenon 
has become very pronounced. But in the recent past, the phenomenon of dollarization has 
become intense in virtually all developing countries especially African countries without 
much attention. Therefore, the focus of this study is to document key determinants of deposit 
dollarization in 18 Sub-Saharan African Countries for which data is available. This study is 
important because region-specific factors driving dollarization can be identified which 
provides the basis for comparative analysis of the determinants of dollarization in Africa with 
its determinants in other continents. Also, elaborate studies on the determinants of 
dollarization beyond country-specific studies in Africa have been lacking. This study is an 
attempt to fill the gap.  
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 traces the evolution 
of dollarization in selected African countries while section 3 presents literature review. 
Section 4 contains the methodology and section 5 presents empirical results of the model. 
Sections 6 contain policy implications of results while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Evolution of Deposit Dollarization in Selected African Countries 
 The evolution of deposit dollarization in selected African countries is presented in this 
section. This is to give us an idea about the extent and the dynamics of its behaviour over 
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time and space. In Botswana for example, deposit dollarization has been on the increase as 
from 1998 and reached its peak in 2007. One of the major drivers of this phenomenon was 
inflation uncertainty exacerbated by exchange rate instability. While the Pula/Rand exchange 
rate have been stable over the period under review, the Pula/Dollar instability was obvious 
creating an environment of instability leading to deposit dollarization as asset holders tries to 
avoid loss of value of their assets due to Pula/Dollar exchange rate instability. On the other 
hand, the Pula/Pound exchange rate has been relatively more stable but the pula has 
consistently been depreciating against the British pound sterling (see figure 2). The mono-
product and undiversified nature of the economy also increased the vulnerability of the 
economy. Another perceived structure of the economy is the huge number of foreign 
nationals who prefer to keep their assets in foreign currency to avoid domestic loss of value 
due to inflation and exchange rate swings following periodic discrete devaluation of the Pula, 
i.e. the national currency.  
Evolution of Deposit Dollarization and Inflation in 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Deposit dollarization in Botswana (1995-2007) 
 
Evolution of Dollarization and exchange rates in Botswana
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Years
D
ep
o
si
t D
o
lla
riz
at
io
n
 
(%
)
Pula/Dollar Exchange rate
Pula/Rand Exchange Rate
Pula/Pound Exchange Rate
Dollarization Index
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Deposit dollarization and Exchange Rates in Botswana (1995-2007) 
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 In Nigeria, the period after the implementation of structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) in 1986 witnessed significant fluctuations in macroeconomic variables which 
engendered the use of foreign currency as store of value in the domestic banking system. For 
example, while the institutional framework required to support a deregulated economy was 
non-existence in 1986, appropriate legal framework, domestic financial instruments, and 
well-trained bureaucrats for the implementation of the SAP programme were totally absent 
(Yinusa and Akinlo, 2008a). Aside from this, fiscal indiscipline on the part of the government 
(Military regime) was at its peak. Hence, the economy was overheated. The main source of 
the monetary growth was expansionary fiscal operations, financed mainly by the banking 
system. Fiscal deficits rose from about 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1988 to 11.0 per cent in 1991, 
but moderated somewhat to 7.2 per cent in 1992 before peaking at 15.5 per cent in 1995. 
However, fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP has moderated at less than 10 percent since 
2000 up to 2006 (see Figure 3). 
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 Figure 3: Some Macroeconomic Indicators in Nigeria (1980-2005) 
 
Sequel to these instabilities in the economy, deposit dollarization has been on the increase but 
generally around 10 percent of broad money after adjusting for domestic currency in 
circulation.  
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Figure 3: Deposit Dollarization in Nigeria (1994-2005) 
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Most of the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa displayed similar pattern in terms of deposit 
dollarization as shown in the Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Dollarization Index in Selected African Countries (1992 – 2004) 
Year Countries 
Angola Bots Kenya Tanzania Uganda Malawi Sudan 
1992 - - - 
- 0.146778 
- 
0.276000 
1993 - - - 
0.179196 0.127902 
- 
0.494254 
1994 - - - 
0.211607 0.119407 
- 
0.454217 
1995 
0.104497 0.088920 0.097490 0.280649 0.153377 
- 
0.504014 
1996 
0.359601 0.100618 0.087987 0.242100 0.137586 0.591890 0.424311 
1997 
0.577376 0.125868 0.109047 0.260823 0.153440 1.500289 0.435313 
1998 
0.720895 0.175008 0.112775 0.253141 0.175094 1.027473 0.442672 
1999 
0.808099 0.159072 0.149161 0.294880 0.219521 1.208839 0.437102 
2000 
0.834345 0.171876 0.199137 0.302480 0.271000 1.095508 0.405869 
2001 
0.809553 0.216546 0.201934 0.329007 0.310975 0.871194 0.416153 
2002 
0.848905 0.170085 0.221097 0.348075 0.272783 0.687986 0.409566 
2003 
0.731010 0.145289 0.226941 0.363546 0.331592 0.642974 0.378691 
2004 - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Source: IFS, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
 
Table 1 reveals that deposit dollarization has been on the increase in most African economies 
since the early 1990s. However, the phenomenon became manifest in the mid 1990s 
following the introduction and implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 
these economies. For example, while deposit dollarization was just about 9% in Kenya in 
1995, it rose to about 14% in 1999 and reached a value of about 23% in 2003. A similar 
pattern can be observed for Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan. A very conspicuous case is the 
dollarization episode in Angola. The country had dollarization index of about 10% in 1995, 
rising to about 80% in 2000 and peaked at about 84% in 2002 before decelerating slightly to 
about 73% in 2003. All these reveal that dollarization is an issue in Africa and its evolution 
requires adequate attention than currently given in the literature. 
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3. Literature Review  
Deposit dollarization, defined broadly as the act of switching from holding domestic 
currency into holding foreign currencies by rational economic agents in bank accounts 
domiciled in domestic banks. The currency substitution literature has tried to explain why 
some economies use a foreign currency instead of the domestic currency in their everyday 
transactions and bank deposits2. Basic analytical framework has been the consumer’s 
portfolio selection model where dollarization is determined by the relative rates of returns of 
domestic currency and foreign currency denominated assets. In some cases the rates of return 
differentials help to explain dollarization trends (see Balino et.al. 1999). However, in other 
cases the same model is proved to be less successful in explaining swings in dollarization 
ratios. For example, Civcir, (2003) reports that in Turkey, real rates of return on domestic 
currency assets have increased significantly relative to foreign currency assets, but 
dollarization ratio remained persistently high. This suggests that other variables should be 
incorporated into these models. 
Another branch of literature developed by Ortiz (1983), Ramirez-Rojas (1985), 
Fasano-Filho (1987), Melvin (1988), Calvo and Vegh (1992) and Salvastore (2001b) has 
focused on the determinants and characteristics of the currency substitution in developing 
countries. The nature of the currency substitution in these countries is different from the one 
analysed by the literature on developed nations. In particular, in the LDCs process tends to be 
asymmetrical because domestic residents usually hold foreign money in their portfolios but 
there is no foreign demand for domestic currencies. 
Currency substitution in developing countries is usually one of the ultimate 
consequences of high and variable inflation (Mizen and Pentecost, 1996). High inflation, in 
turn, is the result of the fiscal imbalances, which leads to dollarization and eventually to 
currency substitution. Institutional factors play a crucial role in the process of currency 
substitution. When restriction on holding of foreign currency is removed the dollarization 
process usually begins with the foreign money substituting domestic money as a store of 
value. As high inflation continues, some prices -particularly of real estates, cars and other 
”big ticket” items – start to be quoted in foreign currency. After this, some transactions begin 
                                               
2
 The terms currency substitution and dollarization have been used to depict the same phenomenon. However, 
the term “dollarization” indicates that a foreign currency serves as a unit of account or as a store of value, and 
not necessarily as a medium of exchange. In high inflation countries, foreign currency is first used as a store of 
value or unit of account and only at the later used as a medium of exchange. That is, currency substitution is 
normally the last stage of the dollarization process. More importantly, in practice, data on foreign currency 
circulating in the economy usually does not exist, dollarization ratios are used as an indicator of currency 
substitution (see Calvo and Vegh 1992). 
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to be performed in foreign currency especially those involving large transfer of funds. 
However, domestic money seems to retain its functions as a unit of account and medium of 
exchange in almost all nondurable goods (see Calvo and Vegh 1992). 
Another strand of literature on currency substitution considers dollarization hysteresis. 
Works by Dornbush and Reynoso (1989), Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992), Kamin and 
Ericsson (1993), Clements and Schwartz (1993) shows that several Latin American countries 
have hysteresis in the dollarization ratios. Hysteresis refers to the fact that dollarization 
phenomenon have stayed high in the face of declining inflation rates and increased real rates 
of returns on domestic assets. This phenomenon can not be explained by the traditional 
currency substitution models which, following Calvo and Rodriguez (1977), assume that 
foreign assets (non interest bearing) compete with domestic money in providing liquidity 
services. In these models, ratio of foreign to domestic currency denominated assets depends 
positively on the nominal interest rates (when the domestic interest rates increase liquidity 
provided by domestic money decreases and liquidity provided by foreign money increases 
(see Sahay and Vegh 1996). Therefore, a fall in inflation (i.e. a fall in domestic interest rates) 
should lower the demand for foreign currency relative to domestic currency. 
To explain hysteresis in these models, it is necessary to assume that there are some 
costs associated with the process of currency substitution which make it irreversible. 
Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) and Dornbusch, Sturzenegger and Wolf (1990) argue that 
process of financial adaptation is costly (due to sunk cost and learning by doing), which 
makes them irreversible. In a related explanation Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) assume that 
it is costly to switch between currencies and show that there is a ‘band’ for the inflation 
differential above which dollarization continues to occur even if inflation falls. A similar 
result is derived by Sturzenegger (1997), who emphasises the public good aspect of currency 
substitution by assuming it is costly to transact in foreign currency but only to the extent that 
others have not yet begun to use it. Uribe (1997) also emphasises the relation between private 
cost of transaction and the aggregate degree of dollarization. 
The literature cited above considers currency substitution but not dollarization which 
is the observable measure of currency substitution. With this observed data dollarization ratio 
should respond only to differences in real rates of returns between domestic and foreign 
currency denominated assets (see Sahay and Vegh, 1996). A fall in domestic rate of inflation 
rate should not affect dollarization ratio unless it affects real rates of returns. Hence, de-
dollarization would only result only from the higher real return on domestic currency 
denominated assets. Conversely, dollarization would be the consequence of very low real 
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rates of return on domestic currency denominated assets together with the institutional 
freedom to invest in foreign currency denominated assets at home. In several developing 
countries, dollarization associated with low real rates of return on domestic currency 
denominated assets (see Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1989 and Salvastore, 2001b). Civcir (2003) 
observed that in some countries like Turkey, while real rates of return on the domestic 
currency denominated financial assets were substantially higher than that of foreign currency 
assets, the dollarization stayed high. In such cases, real rates of return criterion do not seem to 
explain the behaviour of the households in the dollarized country. There must be other factors 
that affect the decision making process by the public. There is an asymmetric substitution 
process between domestic and foreign currencies, that is, in a dollarized economy the demand 
for foreign currency rises when the local currency depreciates, but falls by a lesser extent 
when the local currency appreciates. 
Yotopoulos (1997) explains the currency substitution as an asymmetric reputation 
between hard and soft currencies. Hard currencies have a good reputation of stability, but soft 
currencies, in contrast, is expected to depreciate in a free currency market since it lacks the 
reputation of safe haven. Under these circumstances and also when the international financial 
transactions are present, there is asymmetric demand for domestic residents to hold dollar as 
a store of value – a demand not offset by Americans' holding of domestic currency as an 
asset. This asymmetry tends to increase the price of dollar in home country. This encourages 
dollarization with domestic resident fleeing from domestic currency in exchange for dollar, 
which causes further deprecations. Expectations of depreciation become self-fulfilling 
prophecies, in fixed, floating or pegged exchange rate systems. 
With the asymmetric reputation still operating, fixed exchange rate had to fend with 
the tide of domestic currency denominated asset holders in the country who want to hedge 
their wealth against depreciation of currency by buying dollars. This was done by offsetting 
this precautionary demand through increasing the supply of speculative short term capital that 
the banking system borrowed in the international market. There is a causal relationship 
between dollarization and inflow of hot money in which the latter is lured by high interest 
rates in an attempt to thwart the former. Asymmetric substitution behaviour of the households 
can be attributed to cost considerations, once the fixed cost of an investment in new money 
management techniques are born, the new product or strategy remains in place and is not 
discarded even though interest rates, inflation or depreciation rates decline. In a high 
chronicle inflation countries the asymmetric behaviour of the individuals to change (ratchet 
effect) can be attributed to a costly process of developing, learning, and applying new 
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strategies to beat inflation or get the highest return on their investment. Such strategies are 
commonly called financial innovations; inter-alia, rapid switching between demand deposits 
and saving deposits in domestic currency, the evolution of high yielding or indexed money 
substitutes, the efficient use of overdrafts, the application of portfolio optimisation methods, 
and most notably, the flight into foreign currency assets. Over time, an increasing proportion 
of public resorts to these forms of financial innovations. There are a few incentives for 
households and enterprises to switch back to domestic currency after the end of instability or 
when a higher rate of return on the domestic currency is offered. Thus causing a more 
prolonged -ratchet effect- on the relative demand for foreign and domestic currency. The 
credibility of the authorities’ stabilization effort may shorten or extend the duration of the 
ratchet effect as well as influence its strength. 
Only an expectation of significant decline in inflation or a considerable appreciation 
of currency or substantial increase in the real rates of return on domestic currency 
denominated assets can overcome the sunk cost in inflation beating strategies and provide 
enough incentives for households to eventually revert to traditional domestic money balances.  
Oresotu and Mordi (1992), Olomola (1999) Akinlo (2003) and more recently Yinusa 
and Akinlo (2008b) investigates the existence and determinants of dollarization in Nigeria 
using the portfolio balance model. The results points to the existence of currency substitution 
while the major force driving the process was real parallel market exchange rate volatility and 
the US monetary policy changes. 
Elkhafif (2002) uses an error-correction model to examine the dynamics of the 
currency substitution phenomenon in two Africa's emerging economies: Egypt and South 
Africa. The study finds a high degree of currency substitution for the Egyptian economy 
(51%) while the phenomenon was found to be insignificant in South Africa (less than 1% in 
the early years and about 6% later). Prock, Soydemir and Abugrri (2003), investigated the 
existence of currency substitution in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for the period October 
1986 and June 2001 using monthly observations within the vector autoregressive framework 
popularized by Sim (1980). The study found significant presence of currency substitution in 
Argentina and Brazil. However, they attributed the lack of significant result for currency 
substitution in Mexico to its credible exchange rate and monetary policy. They argued that 
Mexico had record of relative financial stability in the recent past. The paper concluded that 
“policy makers, who wish to adopt another country’s currency as a domestic currency, 
[should] first implement structural reforms to bring their economy in line with the anchor 
currency country.”  
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Soydan (2003) assessed the implications of currency substitution for the maximization 
of seigniorage revenue in Turkey following liberalization programme implemented in the 
economy. The hypothesis of seigniorage maximization was tested using the Cagan (1956) 
model based on a semi-logarithmic money demand function of inflation and real income 
adopting cointegration analysis within the framework of Vector Autoregression (VAR). The 
paper finds that actual inflation (13%) in the Turkish economy was higher than the optimum 
inflation (11.8%) suggested by the econometric results. Hence, the paper concluded that 
currency substitution limits the potential of Turkish Central Bank in raising seigniorage 
revenue and by implication monetary policy through money creation. To this end, an attempt 
to increase seigniorage revenue may push the economy towards hyperinflationary path 
thereby generating higher levels of currency substitution in the economy. 
 Recently, Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) used dynamic money in the utility function 
model, in which money services are produced both by domestic and foreign money balances 
to empirically investigate the existence of currency substitution between Russian Rubies and 
the US dollar and analyzed some implications of dollarization for the Russian economy.  
Using 2SLS-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation methodology on the data 
between 1995 and 2000, the authors estimated the various parameters of their equations for 
the Russian economy. Based on the estimated parameters, the implications of dollarization 
were simulated. This was achieved by analyzing the influence of dollarization on seigniorage 
revenue and welfare. Overall, their result points to a significant presence of currency 
substitution in Russia while the estimates also indicate a significant welfare loss as a result of 
dollarization. Also, this study demonstrated quantitatively that dollarization might limit the 
ability of domestic central banks in using inflationary policy for stabilization purposes since 
“dollarization may have a large negative effects on the revenue from seigniorage” (Friedman 
and Verbetsky, 2001; p.23). This means that with dollarization, the potency of domestic 
monetary policy in achieving stability in the dollarized economy may be seriously impaired.   
In terms of welfare effects of dollarization/de-dollarization, their result indicates that welfare 
may surfer negatively following de-dollarization efforts unless certain precautions are taking. 
According to the authors, inflation stabilization (less than or equal to 1% per month) must 
first be the priority before attempting de-dollarization policies. The value of this welfare loss 
was estimated at about 1-2 percent of GDP, which is comparable with actual revenue from 
seigniorage. They therefore concluded that sufficient macroeconomic stability (in particular 
price stability) is the surest way to reduce the negative implications of currency substitution. 
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According to Gruben and Mcleod (2004, p.6), dollarization is propelled by 
“globalization of currency and the banking services.” As such, “making their currencies more 
competitive” will make dollarizing countries surfer serious price instability. To them, 
globalization leads to increased capital inflows which serve to increase the domestic money 
supply beyond that forecasted by monetary authorities when initial policies are being 
formulated and “inappropriate” Central Bank responses to capital inflow (for whatever 
reasons), leads to high inflationary spiral which ultimately ignite the process of dollarization.  
Hence, they seem to agree with the suggestion of inflation stabilization as put forward by 
Friedman and Verbetsky (2001). The paper concludes that causality runs one-way from 
dollarization to inflation. This article differs in that we present evidence for Sub-Saharan 
African countries for which there has not been a cross country study with greater scope for 
generalisation on the key determinants of dollarization. 
 
4. Methodology 
This section briefly describes the methodology adopted in this study to assess the 
effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on deposit dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa. In what 
follows, the empirical model employed in this article, econometric procedure and data and 
variable measurements are presented.  
 
4.1 Model Specification 
 Following from standard money demand function in a flexible exchange rate 
environment the equation estimated is of the form3: 
*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8* *(1 )eit it it it it it it it it i itDI i i e CAR CAR y ERV PR u eα β β β β pi β pi β β β= + + + + + − + + + + + . (1) 
where all variables except interest rates are expressed in logarithms. itDI  is dollarization 
index, ti  the domestic policy interest rate, *ti denotes foreign rate of interest, proxy by Federal 
Funds rate, ete , the expected change in the exchange rate, itpi is a measure of domestic 
inflation computed from price of the domestic consumer’s consumption bundle, CAR is a 
dummy to capture capital account restriction while (1-CAR) represents absence of 
                                               
3
 To conserve space, no theoretical discussions on the relationship between higher exchange rate variability and 
currency substitution are presented here. For the same reason, we do not discuss the theoretical effects of 
domestic interest rate, expected exchange rate, foreign rate of interest, domestic price level and output. A 
treatment of this issue can be found in Brandson and Henderson (1985), Cuddington (1983), and Mizen and 
Pentecost (1996). 
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restrictions in the domestic economy, CAR and (1-CAR) were allowed to interact with 
domestic inflation. This enables us test the hypothesis that inflation in a closed economy 
tends to stimulate increased dollarization. ity is the PPP value of domestic output, measured 
by GDP at PPP values, tERV is a measure of exchange rate volatility, PR is political terror 
scale used as a proxy for political risk factor in the model to explain dollarization and tu  is 
the error term. 
In this paper, exchange rate volatility was extracted via a state-space model (a form of 
signal to noise extraction) of the form: 
;2
1
th
tt eZ σε=  ------------- )1,0(iid ………………………………………………... (2) 
where, 
1t t th hλ µ+ = + --------------- 2(0, ) 1NID µσ λ ≤ …………………….. ……………... (3) 
tZ  is the exchange rate. The term σ
2 is a scale factor and subsumes the effect of a constant in 
the regression of ht. λ , is a parameter, tµ  is a disturbance term that is uncorrelated with tε , 
tε  is an (0,1)iid  which are random disturbances symmetrically distributed about zero. The ht 
equation is a transition equation in autoregressive form where the absolute value of pi is less 
than unity to ensure that the process in equation (2) is stationary (Ndung’u, 2001; Yinusa, 
2008). These equations generate the conditional volatility of exchange rate used in equation 
(1) for estimation purpose.  
 
4.2 Econometric Procedure 
This article employed both Pool Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and Panel Least 
Squares for a group of 18 Sub-Saharan economies between 1980 and 2004. A serious 
empirical challenge in the estimation of cross-country regressions concerns how to decide 
whether to use random or fixed effect model. In other to resolve this dilemma, Hausman 
(1978) test was employed. The Hausman (1978) test statistic supports fixed effect model. 
Hence, the pool OLS models were estimated with cross-section effects and corrected for 
cross-section correlation, period arbitrary serial correlation and time varying variances in the 
disturbances, and observation specific heteroskedasticity. However, the key assumption made 
for the OLS is the orthogonality between the error term and regressors. Under conditional 
homoskedasticity and the assumption that all the regressors are exogenous, OLS is an 
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efficient Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. In addition to pooled OLS, 
panel least squares estimation approach was also employed.  
Another major consideration in econometric analysis concerning time series data is 
the non-stationarity of underlining data. If non-stationarity is not accounted for in the 
estimation process, it may lead to spurious regression with serious negative consequences for 
public policy. In this respect, unit root tests within a panel framework was conducted using 
Im, Pesaran and Shun (1997, 2003), augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979), Phillips and Perron 
(1988), Levin and Lin (1992, 1993) tests.  
The next step involves testing for cointegration among the variables. There are 
different methods for testing cointegration in panels. The first method takes the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration and uses residuals derived from the panel regression of Engle 
and Granger (1987) method. Pedroni (1995, 1997), McCoskey and Kao (1998) panel 
cointegration tests are based on this method. Another approach is to take the null of 
cointegration and is the basis of the tests proposed by Harris and Inder (1994), Shin (1994), 
Leybourne and MacCabe (1994) and Kwiatowski et. al. (1992). All the panel data 
cointegration tests allow for heterogeneity in the cointegrating coefficients. But one drawback 
related with these tests is that the null and alternative hypotheses imply that either all the 
relationships are cointegrated or all the relationships are not cointegrated. Except the Fisher 
(1932) test, there is no allowance for some relationships to be cointegrated and others not. 
Initially developed panel cointegration tests applied panel unit root tests directly to the 
residuals from an Engle Granger type two-step methodology. But the recent opinion in the 
literature suggested that the test statistics using this approach would be biased towards 
accepting stationarity. Pedroni (1995) shows that applying panel unit root tests directly to 
regression residuals is inappropriate for several reasons like the lack of exogeneity of the 
regressors and the dependency of the residuals on the distribution of the estimated 
coefficients (see Pedroni (1995,1997) for details). For these reasons it is important to have a 
test procedure for cointegration which is robust to the presence of heterogeneity in the 
alternative. Since the cointegration test proposed by Pedroni allows for considerable 
heterogeneity, it is preferred in this study.  
4.3 Data, Variable Definition and Measurement 
Annual data spanning the period 1980-2004 was used for this study. Dollarization 
index (DI) is measured as the ratio of FCD and M2. M2 is money supply broadly defined less 
domestic currency in circulation.  We subtracted money in circulation from M2 so as not to 
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under-estimate the relative weight of foreign currency deposits in the banking system. FCD is 
foreign currency deposits in domestic banking sector. This is the sum of FCD in commercial 
and merchant banks in countries where universal banking is not the practice.  It is our 
measure of deposit dollarization from the store of value perspective. pi  is a measure of 
domestic inflation, y is a measure of transactions in the economy and possibly accumulation 
of wealth. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was used to measure this variable. i  is the 
treasury bill rate. This is used as a measure of opportunity cost of holding money and an 
alternative wealth allocation to money holdings. *i  is a measure of return on foreign money 
proxy by Federal Funds rate plus expected exchange rate depreciation. This is measured as 
bilateral rate of exchange between the various country currencies and US dollar. ee measures 
the expected change in exchange rate. The hypothesis that capital account restriction 
stimulates dollarization was tested by using capital account dummy computed from IMF 
survey on features of exchange arrangements and regulatory frameworks for current and 
capital transactions in member countries, various years.  Dummy takes the value 1 when a 
restriction is in place and 0 otherwise. 
Econometric studies on dollarization have used different proxies for expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Ortiz (1983) used the difference between the official and 
real exchange rate for expected exchange rate depreciation. Cuddington (1983) used the ratio 
of the difference between forward and spot exchange rate to spot rate as a proxy for expected 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Ramirez-Rojaz (1985) used the same measure for Mexico, 
the current differential between inflation rates in Argentina and U.S. for Argentina, and the 
differential between the domestic interest paid on the deposit denominated domestic currency 
and the domestic interest paid in foreign currency deposits for Uruguay. Clements and 
Schwartz (1993) used inflation rate differential between U.S. and Bolivia. Selcuk (1994) used 
trade weighted real exchange rate index and TL per $ nominal exchange rate as a proxy for 
expected depreciation of the exchange rate for Turkey, and Akcay et al (1997) used estimated 
exchange rate volatility based on the estimation of PPP for Turkey. Boero and Tullio (1996) 
in their German money demand function used interest rates differential between Germany 
and U.S. and percentage deviation of the Mark and Dollar rate from PPP to measure the 
currency substitution. In this paper the expected depreciation is proxied by the actual annual 
changes in the real exchange rate. This is calculated as the difference between current and 
one-year-lagged values of the nominal exchange rate between the various currencies and 
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dollar. The data were sourced mainly from International Financial statistics (various years) 
supported with data from statistical bulletin from respective countries. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Empirical results from the study are presented here. Unit root tests were conducted 
followed by panel cointegration tests before the empirical model was estimated.  
 
5.1 Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Results 
The panel unit root test results reported in Table 2 of the appendix shows evidence of 
non-stationarity in levels. According to LLC and IPS test results, the null of non-stationarity 
is accepted for all the critical values at lag order 4. One of the ways to deal with I (1) 
variables is to investigate the cointegration relationship between variables.   
 
 
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests  
    (Individual effects, individual linear trends) 
      Method 
Variables LLC 
p-
value Breitung 
p-
value IPS 
p-
value ADF 
p-
value PP 
p-
value 
Hadri Z-
stat 
p-
value 
di  0 -103.92 0.00 -2.01 0.02 -55.04 0.00 298.79 0.00 337.87 0.00 15.54 0.00 
 
 1 -45.57 0.00 -7.10 0.00 -11.28 0.00 552.79 0.00 985.13 0.00 36.28 0.00 
 
 2 -36.75 0.00 -10.71 0.00 -11.73 0.00 705.46 0.00 3575.66 0.00 45.71 0.00 
eexr  0 -123.10 0.00 -6.16 0.00 -40.06 0.00 825.74 0.00 1242.01 0.00 11.97 0.00 
 
 1 -71.97 0.00 -9.33 0.00 -31.99 0.00 1216.98 0.00 5480.57 0.00 13.60 0.00 
 
 2 -16.53 0.00 -11.46 0.00 -23.72 0.00 996.26 0.00 11153.50 0.00 34.37 0.00 
erv  0 -16.11 0.00 1.14 0.87 2.83 1.00 451.71 0.00 626.60 0.00 24.54 0.00 
 
 1 -22.81 0.00 -7.29 0.00 -6.05 0.00 697.14 0.00 873.85 0.00 3.82 0.00 
 
 2 -11.98 0.00 -12.27 0.00 -7.56 0.00 1059.80 0.00 5616.17 0.00 9.32 0.00 
y  0 2.03 0.98 14.36 1.00 3.73 1.00 150.30 0.86 125.04 1.00 15.38 0.00 
 
 1 -19.27 0.00 -9.33 0.00 -19.37 0.00 672.32 0.00 772.28 0.00 8.88 0.00 
 
 2 -30.74 0.00 -19.36 0.00 -33.32 0.00 1268.39 0.00 6391.62 0.00 26.70 0.00 
r  0 -0.20 0.42 -4.55 0.00 -9.47 0.00 369.05 0.00 330.94 0.00 4.24 0.00 
 
 1 -200.70 0.00 -11.97 0.00 -32.63 0.00 848.49 0.00 1434.25 0.00 94.68 0.00 
 
 2 -147.37 0.00 -12.19 0.00 -37.00 0.00 1028.92 0.00 6014.24 0.00 95.97 0.00 
usffr  0 -30.19 0.00 -3.02 0.00 -24.94 0.00 869.39 0.00 158.76 0.87 12.04 0.00 
 
 1 -27.31 0.00 -26.03 0.00 -23.14 0.00 803.90 0.00 1045.73 0.00 23.80 0.00 
 
 2 0.13 0.55 -31.21 0.00 -23.70 0.00 836.92 0.00 9263.38 0.00 98.38 0.00 
inf  0 24.07 1.00 -0.41 0.34 -20.13 0.00 588.62 0.00 701.05 0.00 9.35 0.00 
  1 -988.44 0.00 -8.62 0.00 
-
108.82 0.00 1043.03 0.00 2932.80 0.00 40.39 0.00 
    2 -469.51 0.00 -9.64 0.00 -72.90 0.00 1370.00 0.00 9793.99 0.00 46.82 0.00 
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The Pedroni panel cointegration test was employed. Except for panel variance and panel ADF 
statistics, all of the panel cointegration test statistics developed by Pedroni rejects the null of 
no cointegration at 5 percentage significance level (see Table 3). Since there is a 
cointegration relationship between the variables, the Engle and Granger two-step method can 
be used. According to Engle and Granger (1987), if the variables are cointegrated, the stable 
long-run relationship can be estimated by standard least-squares techniques. 
 
Table 3: Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
Series: DI R USFFR Y PR EEXR INF ERV    
Lag selection: Automatic SIC with max lag of 0 to 1  
Newey-West bandwidth selection with Bartlett kernel  
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic  0.277527  0.3839  0.050413  0.3984 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.794898  0.0797  1.799970  0.0790 
Panel PP-Statistic -5.071379  0.0000 -5.362630  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -3.392631  0.0013 -3.665363  0.0005 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  2.573689  0.0145   
Group PP-Statistic -6.017267  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -3.870287  0.0002   
      
      
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration Sample: 1980 2004; Cross-sections included: 18; Included observations: 450. 
 
5.2 Determinants of Dollarization: Pooled OLS-Fixed Effects Results 
Table 4 presents the results on the effect of macroeconomic fluctuation on deposit 
dollarization in selected Sub-Sahara African countries. I present POLS fixed effects (FE) 
estimation results. Figures in brackets are t-statistics and the * shows the level of 
significance. Specifically, the model was estimated for the periods 1980-1990, 1991-2000, 
2001-2004 and 1980-2004. This allows inter-temporal comparison of effect of 
macroeconomic fluctuations on dollarization in Africa under different robust estimation 
techniques. 
First three columns of Table 4 contain the results for the full sample (i.e. 1980-2004) 
and attempts to examine the relative importance of expected exchange rate changes and 
exchange rate volatility in explaining dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa. The summary 
statistics are quite satisfactory with the value of adjusted R-squared ranging between 0.90 and 
0.97. This shows that between 90% and 97% of the variation in dollarization is explained by 
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the identified explanatory variables. The Durbin-Watson statistic shows no evidence of 
autocorrelation and the f-statistic reveals that the explanatory power of the model is good. 
Looking at the coefficients of all independent variables, the first three columns of Table 4 
shows that all identified explanatory variables are significant determinants of dollarization 
with expected signs except domestic deposit rate of interest which is insignificant but with 
expected negative sign. As expected, the last three columns show that high inflation 
interacting with capital account restriction is positively and significantly related to 
dollarization in the 1980s while the effect is negative and insignificant in the 1990s and 
2000s. For the total sampled period, the overall effect is positive and significant in column 
one but insignificant  for column two and three when expected exchange rate changes was 
replaced with exchange rate volatility as an alternative measure of uncertainty. This tends to 
suggest that the effect of high inflation plus capital account restriction was particularly 
relevant in determining dollarization in the 1980s and seem to dominate its effect post 1980s. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa (1980-2004). 
Estimation Technique: POLS: Cross-section Fixed Effects-White period  
Dependent Variable: Dollarization Index (DI) 
1980-
2004 
1980-
2004 
1980-
2004   
1980-
1990 
1991-
2000 
2001-
2004 
Constant -3.19* 0.21 -0.43   -4.16* 4.48* -2.82* 
  (-2.29) (1.35) (-0.30)   (-4.79) (2.21) (-3.70) 
Deposit Rate of Interest (r %) -0.20 -0.20 -0.26   -0.49 -0.16 0.16*** 
  (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.36)   (-0.88) (-0.43) (1.59) 
US Federal Funds Rate (USFFR %) 0.17* -0.29 0.1208   0.19* 0.24* -0.12 
  (2.10) (-0.49) (1.10)   (2.72) (3.35) (-0.90) 
Expected Exchange Rate Depreciation (EEXR) 0.48** - 0.34   0.15* 0.13** 0.19 
  (1.99)  (1.98)   (3.70) (1.88) (0.41) 
Domestic Inflation Rate (INF*CAR) 0.24** 0.37 0.15   0.19** -0.31 0.13 
  (2.72) (0.50) (0.81)   (1.99) (-1.05) (1.24) 
Domestic Inflation Rate (INF*(1-CAR)) 0.15* -0.56 -0.59   0.33** 0.63* -0.75 
  (2.41) (-0.99) (-0.65)   (1.99) (2.56) (-0.88) 
Economic Growth (log(GDP)) 2.51* -3.08 0.66   2.20* 2.0* 0.97 
  (4.59) (-1.30) (0.35)   (2.56) (2.26) (1.19) 
Political Risk factor (PR) -0.14** -0.22** -0.17*  -0.19** -0.21** -0.19 
 (-1.84) (-1.99) (-2.08)  (-1.85) (-1.98) (-0.25) 
Exchange Rate Volatility (ERV) - 0.35 0.46   - - - 
   (2.72) (2.09)     
        
Summary Statistics               
Adj. R-Square 0.93 0.90 0.92   0.94 0.95 0.97 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.99 1.69 2.95   2.08 1.99 2.03 
F-Statistic 97.41 72.83 69.72   67.61 87.35 91.85 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cross sections included 18 18 18   18 18 18 
Observations 450 450 450   198 198 90 
* Indicates significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and *** significant at the 10%level.   
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This could be so given that the 1980-1990 represented the last phase of financial 
repression in most African countries with its residual effect on dollarization. However, the 
insignificance of the coefficient on this variable in the 1990s and beyond may be due to 
significant progress made in most economies in liberalizing their economies especially 
capital account liberalization that has made off-shore banking and financial transfer much 
more easier than ever before. Another reason could be the significant effort of most 
governments in fighting inflation in resent years which tend to reduce dollarization (see 
Gruben and McLeod, 2004). 
Political risk factor was found to have negative sign in all the models. However, the 
coefficients are generally statistically significant except for the period 2001-2004. This 
suggests that in African economies where political factors are important, deposit dollarization 
may not be significant. The negative sign found in this article supports our a priori 
expectation because economic theory suggests that deposit dollarization in domestic banking 
system tend to decrease in economies where political risk factors are important. Fear of 
political persecution and possible confiscation of assets denominated in foreign currency may 
drive financial resources off-shore except in countries where capital account restrictions are 
in place.  
The relevance of domestic inflation in explaining deposit dollarization in African   
countries characterized by closed and open capital accounts was tested by including and 
interaction term between domestic inflation and capital account openness and restrictions. 
The result indicates that the coefficient on inflation in economies with closed capital accounts 
is positively significant in all periods except 1991-2000. Although the coefficients for all 
periods are positive, they are generally insignificant at 5% levels. Conversely, domestic 
inflation in countries with relatively opened capital accounts tend to increase deposit 
dollarization except for the period 2001-2004. The negative sign indicates that as domestic 
inflation increases coupled with open capital accounts in African economies, asset holders 
tend to move their assets off-shore in other to avoid domestic inflation thereby reducing 
deposit dollarization. However, for most of the periods and indeed the entire sample period, 
domestic inflation interacting with open capital accounts actually led to increased deposit 
dollarization rather that decreasing it.  
Domestic economic growth seem be an important factor in explaining deposit 
dollarization. Although positively related with dollarization in the period 1980-2004, the sign 
changed when exchange rate volatility was used as a measure of macroeconomic uncertainty 
and expected exchange rate changes was dropped. Also, economic growth was positively 
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related to deposit dollarization during the 1980s and 1990s as shown in the 4th and 5th 
columns of Table 4. 
In all, it could be argued that the main determinants of dollarization in Sub-Sahara 
African countries are: changes in US monetary policy, expected exchange rate changes, 
actual volatility in exchange rate, interaction term between domestic inflation, capital account 
restrictions and political risk factor.            
 
5.3 Determinants of Dollarization: Panel Least Squares Results 
The results of panel least squares in error correction form are presented in Table 5 
since Pedroni (1995) tests support the existence of cointegration. Generally, results from error 
correction panel least squares seem to support results from pooled OLS. The key 
determinants of dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa remain changes in US monetary policy, 
expectations about future changes in exchange rate, domestic inflation coupled with capital 
account restrictions and exchange rate volatility. The error correction term is rightly signed 
and significant at 1% level. It corrects 37-53 percent of the errors in case of any shock to the 
models in the long run. 
The negative sign on the coefficient of political risk factor supports our earlier result 
under pooled OLS and indicate that in countries where political risk is relevant and 
important, dollarization tends to be low. This is because asset holders will be afraid of forced 
conversion of their assets held in foreign currency to local currency. Hence, this fear may 
drive assets off-shore instead of keeping them in domestic banks in foreign currency 
denominated form.  
The coefficient on inflation in countries with capital account restrictions is positively 
signed as expected in all periods. The positive sign confirms the fact that inflation plus capital 
account restrictions tend to increase dollarization while capital account openness interacting 
with domestic inflation tend to reduce it. This is the case in all periods covered in this article. 
In general, Growth in domestic economic activity is not a significant determinant of 
dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa. In fact the coefficients on economic growth variable is 
negatively signed which points to the fact that it may even reduce dollarization. This is an 
interesting result because a growing and active economy tends to have a strong productive 
base to support the local currency. Therefore, all things being equal, a growing economy in 
real terms with adequate policy in place should not experience dollarization episodes. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa (1980-2004). 
Estimation Technique: Panel Least Squares: Error Correction Models  
Dependent Variable: Dollarization Index (DI) 1980-2004 1980-2004 1980-1999 2000-2004 
Constant -6.65* -2.89 -4.81 1.25 
  (-2.19) (-1.58) (-0.60) (4.50) 
Deposit Rate of Interest (r %) -0.42 -0.11** -0.44 0.37 
  (-1.04) (-1.92) (-0.82) (0.62) 
US Federal Funds Rate (USFFR %) 0.60 -0.21* 1.54*** 1.08* 
  (1.45) (2.01) (1.78) (3.19) 
Expected Exchange Rate Depreciation (EEXR) 0.31*** - 0.40*** 0.66* 
  (1.81)  (1.59) (3.89) 
Domestic Inflation Rate (INF*CAR) 0.49** 0.59** 0.11 0.45* 
  (2.02) (1.99) (0.08) (3.96) 
Domestic Inflation Rate (INF*(1-CAR)) -0.31* -0.12* -0.06 -0.19 
  (-2.98) (2.09) (-0.37) (-0.33) 
Economic Growth (log(GDP)) -0.92 -1.89 -0.66 2.50 
  (-1.22) (-1.09) (-0.61) (-1.55) 
Political Risk factor (PR) -0.83** -0.16*** -1.50 -0.37* 
 (-2.04) (1.89) (-0.55) (-0.59) 
Exchange Rate Volatility (ERV) - 0.11* - - 
   (2.50)   
ECM(-1) -0.37*  -0.40* -0.53* 
 (-2.78)  (-2.54) (-5.04) 
     
Summary Statistics        
Adj. R-Square 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.34 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.08 1.99 2.22 2.05 
F-Statistic 67.01 107.59 49.43 66.12 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cross sections included 18 18 18 18 
Observations 450 450 360 90 
* Indicates significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 5% level and *** significant at the 10%level.  
 
Sequel to the above, it could be concluded that dollarization episodes in Sub-Sahara African 
countries are fall-out of high inflation coupled with capital account restrictions, changes in 
US monetary policy, political risk factor, expectations about exchange rate changes and 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
6.0 Policy Implications of Result 
Given the fact that deposit dollarization is driven by macroeconomic fluctuations in 
Sub-Saharan African countries, it is important to consider policy implications of this 
development for Africa and other developing economies. The first policy consideration may 
be to analyse the implication of deposit dollarization for monetary policy management in 
general and financial system stability in particular. The second may involve the implications 
of deposit dollarization for exchange rate regime choice in Africa. Deposit dollarization 
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complicates monetary policy management and renders it ineffective. This is based on the fact 
that monetary aggregates becomes unpredictable and more sensitive to expected exchange 
rate depreciation. This result corroborates studies by Yinusa and Akinlo, (2008a, 2008b), 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) and Ize and Yeyati (2003). Further deposit dollarization 
may engender higher exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices and weakens monetary 
transmission. This derives from the fact that interest rates on dollars and quantity of dollar 
inflows are not under the control of monetary authorities. As such, the effectiveness of the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission is weakened when most intermediation 
is in foreign currency. Increases in domestic interest rate may become an impotent tool for 
controlling credit expansion even when it is desired (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). 
Given the above, what policy actions should African countries whose currencies are 
being substituted implement to reduce the negative effects of this dollarization? Since deposit 
dollarization has its roots in macroeconomic fluctuations orchestrated by inappropriately 
sequenced macroeconomic reforms (capital account liberalization) coupled with weak 
domestic macroeconomic imbalances, especially, exchange rate volatility, the most powerful 
tool to reduce it would be restoration of sustained confidence in the domestic currency and 
more broadly macroeconomic stability because obviously, liberalization process cannot be 
reversed. As such, macroeconomic policies that ensure long periods of low inflation and 
exchange rate stability become the most powerful policy option that could help stabilize or 
reduce dollarization in Africa.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
The main focus of this study was to identify key determinants of dollarization in 
selected Sub-Sahara African countries. A sample of 18 countries for which data is available 
was used to test various hypotheses about the determinants of dollarization using both pooled 
OLS and panel least square estimation techniques. The results indicate that inflation 
interacting with capital accounts restrictions, expectations about exchange rate changes is 
very crucial in explaining dollarization in Sub-Sahara Africa. Also, Inflation in economies 
with opened capital accounts tends to depress dollarization. While political risk factors are 
important in the 1980 and 1990s, it is unimportant in the 2000s. Results from both pooled and 
panel data indicates that political risk factor will reduce deposit dollarization. This is 
consistent with the a priori expectations. In all, it could be concluded that dollarization in 
sub-Sahara Africa is determined by inflation, political risk factor, changes in US monetary 
policy, domestic rate of interest, exchange rate volatility, and expected exchange rate. 
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